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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the problem of securing data by making it disappear after some time limit, 
making it impossible for it to be recovered by an unauthorized party. This method is in response 
to the need to keep the data secured and to protect the privacy of archived data on the servers, 
Cloud and Peer-to-Peer architectures. Due to the distributed nature of these architectures, it is 
impossible to destroy the data completely. So, we store the data by applying encryption and then 
manage the key, which is easier to do as the key is small and it can be hidden in the DHT 
(Distributed hash table). Even if the keys in the DHT and the encrypted data were compromised, 
the data would still be secure. This paper describes existing solutions, points to their limitations 
and suggests improvements with a new secure architecture. We evaluated and executed this 
architecture on the Java platform and proved that it is more secure than other architectures.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The storage in Cloud and in P2P networks is different from that of data stored on personal 
machines. Data in Cloud and in P2P networks is distributed over many servers and could be 
compromised at any time if not properly secured.   
Trusting Cloud and P2P systems for securing confidential data is risky. A simple solution 
is to encrypt the data and store it in a database to avoid archiving and caching. But, even after 
encryption the data can be decrypted by the service provider, because the service provider has 
access to all the data, keys and it may have been cached. A simple encryption is not enough to 
keep the data secure.  
If the data is available for a fixed time, the possibility of attacking the data can be 
minimized. But it is difficult to ensure that the data is deleted completely after the timeout, as 
there might be copies. A solution to this problem is to store data in an encrypted form and delete 
the key after the timeout. It is easier to manage keys rather than the data. 
Our main objective is to protect data from malicious, legal, and illegal attackers. R. 
Geambasu, T. Kohno, A. A. Levy and H. M. Levy from the University of Washington have 
proposed the Vanish system [1] that follows the timeout concept for keeping the data secure in 
the Cloud. The objective of the Vanish system is to create data that self-destructs or simply 
vanishes after a fixed time, and it occurs without any external actions, so that the data is no 
longer accessible to anyone, even to the user. Initially the Vanish system encrypts the data using 
a random key K and then uses Shamir’s secret sharing technique [2] to split the key into n shares, 
where collecting k (threshold) shares can reconstruct the original key. Vanish later stores these 
random n shares in the DHT (Distributed hash table) [3]. 
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The DHT takes on a central role in making data disappear, where the data in the nodes of 
the DHT will naturally disappear due to the churn effect, arising out of new nodes joining and 
old nodes leaving the network dynamically over time, making it impossible to determine which 
node is responsible for storing data. It is possible to construct the original key or VDO (Vanish 
Data Object) if the Vanish system collects at least k of n shares before the time expires. If the 
time expires, the nodes will automatically vanish making it impossible to extract the k shares, 
and hence no one can reconstruct the original key, making the data inaccessible. 
Although it provides many advantages, Vanish has shortcomings, which are described below: 
1. The minimum timeout is fixed 
2. In order to extend the lifetime of a VDO, Vanish system extracts the key shares, 
generates another set of key shares and distributes them to the nodes. 
3. Key shares are available at the node after the timeout. 
4. Sybil attacks [4]:  Sybil attacks works by continuously crawling the DHT and saving each 
storage value before timeout. 
5. The key shares can be recognized by their key length. 
Based on the above shortcomings, we construct a secure Cloud or P2P storage service on top 
of a public DHT and server infrastructure, where we store the encrypted data in the database and 
then delete the keys after a specific timeout mentioned by the user. In this architecture we apply 
centralized and decentralized techniques to make the system more robust against powerful 
adversaries. We apply the decentralizing technique by using the DHT, and the centralized 
technique using the Ephemerizer [5], which is a central server. Key K is a combination of two 
keys: one is stored on the central server Ephemerizer, and the other is stored in the DHT. 
Similarly, in order to reconstruct original key K for decryption, the system has to gather both of 
the keys, one from the Ephemerizer server and the other from the DHT. This centralized and 
decentralized approach makes the system more robust, as they share risks and threats. This self-
destructive data is best used in email systems and in Cloud storage, and IAAS (infrastructure as a 
service). Using this system, the data can be protected against legal attackers.  
In order to implement this architecture, we use encryption techniques like AES [6], recursive 
secret sharing [7], [8], [9], [10], and hashing [11] and perform key management techniques using 
the Open Chord DHT [12], and global scale P2P. 
 
This architecture is capable of keeping data secure and destroys it after time out even: 
 If attacker has a copy of the data and keys. 
 Without any explicit delete action by user. 
 Without modifying the data or keys. 
Our method uses Vanish system as the base architecture but we modify it to improve 
performance and security to avoid low cost Sybil attacks.  
1.1 Vanish System 
It is known that the threat for a data can be reduced if data was available for a limited time. But it 
is impossible to remove data completely. A simple solution for this problem is to encrypt data 
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before saving it on the database or server and then control the lifetime of the decryption key. 
Keys are small in size they are easy to manage than the huge data.  
 
Figure 1: Vanish system 
In the Vanish system, keys are placed in the nodes of DHT as shown in figure 1. These 
nodes have a tendency of disappearing after a period of time, leading to disappearance of 
decryption keys. Vanish system can be described in two steps, encapsulation, and decapsulation. 
Encapsulation: 
Alice wishes to send a data to Bob. 
1. Alice makes a data object D and encapsulates it into a VDO (Vanish data object) V. In 
order to encapsulate D Alice selects a random key K and encrypts the D to obtain a cipher 
text C. (Figure 2) 
2. Later, Alice uses the threshold secret sharing and splits the data key K into n pieces of 
shares K1, K2, K3…Kn. 
3. Once Alice has computed the key shares K1, K2, K3….Kn she picks a random access key I, 
and selects a pseudorandom number generator keyed by L and derives n indices into the 
DHT I1,I2,I3…In. 
4. Alice then sprinkles the n shares K1, K2, K3…Kn at these pseudorandom location 
throughout the DHT, specifically for each I belongs to {1,2,..n}. 
5. Alice stores the shares Ki at the index Ii in the DHT. 
6. Finally Alice sends a VDO V consists of (L,C,n,threshold) where 
L: Key to derive the indices related to that C.  
C: Cipher text. 
n: number of partitions or shares. 
threshold: minimum number of shares to create the key K. 
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Figure 2: Vanish encapsulation 
 
Decapsulation: 
 
Figure 3: Vanish decapsulation 
1. On receiving VDO, Bob extracts the access key L and derives the location of the shares. 
(Figure 3) 
2. Bob retrieves the threshold number of shares to reconstruct the key K and decrypts the 
cipher text C to get the data D. 
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The main objective of Vanish is to secure the data by not deleting the original data, but by 
making keys disappear in DHT. Vanish was released in August 2009 and it consists of 
encapsulation and decapsulation functions, and a firefox plugin [14]. The user selects the text 
data and converts it into a VDO by right clicking it and selecting the VDO option. It breaks 
encryption keys into 10 shares with a threshold of 7. These shares are pushed into Vuze DHT 
[13], which has a default time out of eight hours. After 8 hours, keys are vanished unless the 
keys are periodically reposted in DHT. 
1.2 Ephemerizer: 
This system also uses same principle as that of Vanish, keeping data available for a finite time 
and making it unrecoverable after a specific time. In this system, instead of distributing the 
decryption keys into the DHT, an external server is used to store the decryption key with their 
time out. During decryption the server provides user with decryption keys till timeout. The 
Ephemerizer server takes care of key management tasks like key creation, advertising, and 
deletion. It creates keys for encryption and stores them on the server and checks them 
periodically for their timeout. It also sends keys for decryption only if their time is not expired. 
 
Figure 4: Ephemerizer architecture 
This system can be explained in detail using an example as shown below: 
Alice wishes to send a data to Bob. 
1. Alice sends a request to the Ephemerizer server for a key K which will be used to 
encrypt the data D given the expiration time T. (Figure 4) 
2. The Ephemerizer generated a random secrets key K, ID for that request. 
3. The Ephemerizer sends (K, ID) to Alice and stores the key K and the timeout T in its 
database. 
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4. Alice encrypts the data D with the key K, and sends (C, ID) to Bob. 
5. On receiving Bob requests the Ephemerizer for the decryption key K for that particular 
ID. 
6. The Ephemerizer searches its database for the secret key K for that particular ID and 
checks its timeout T, if expired return an error message to Bob else return K. 
7. If valid Bob decrypts the cypher text C and extracts the data D. 
1.3 Recursive Secret Sharing: 
A recursive secret sharing is like an ordinary secret sharing system except that it makes it 
possible to store additional secrets. The recursive computational multi secret sharing technique 
hides k - 2 secrets of size b each into n shares of a single secret S of size b, such that any k of the 
n shares sufficient to recreate the secret S. It also makes it possible to store additional secret 
messages s1,s2,s3… along with the main secret S, so that on combining the shares K1, K2,K3…Kk 
of the key K the main secret S and the additional secret messages s1,s2,s3… can be extracted. This 
technique does not require any encryption key. The recursive secret sharing is mainly used for: 
 Hiding additional secrets, which are recursively stored within the shares 
 Validation and authentication of shares during the reconstruction phase, which provides 
cheating detection. The hidden secret share is usually checked for authentication. 
The recursive secret sharing algorithm is as follows. There are two phases: the dealing phase 
– the process of making shares with the secret and hidden information; and the reconstruction 
phase – the process of combing the shares producing secrets and hidden information. 
Dealing Phase 
1. Consider k - 2 secrets si ∈ Zp, 1 ≤ i ≤ (k - 2). 
2. Choose prime p = max(si , S), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ (k - 2). 
3. Randomly and uniformly choose a number y11 ∈ Zp and map it as point (1, y11). 
4. Do for 1 ≤ i ≤ (k - 2) 
a) Interpolate points (0, si) and (j, yij), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i to generate a ith degree polynomial 
pi(x). 
b) Sample the polynomial pi(x) at i + 1 points: y(i+1)j = pi(j + i), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ (i + 1). 
c) Map the i + 1 points as: (j; y(i+1)j), for all 1 ≤ j ≤  (i + 1). 
5. Interpolate points (0, S) and (j, y(k-1)j), for all 1≤ i ≤ (k - 1) to generate (k-1)th degree 
polynomial pk-1(x). 
6. Sample pk-1(x) at n points to generate n shares :(i, pk-1(i)), for all k ≤ i ≤ k + n - 1. 
Reconstruction Phase 
1) Interpolate any k shares to generate (k - 1)th degree polynomial  
pk-1(x) = S+a1x+a2(x2)+…..+ak-1x k-1. 
2) Evaluate S = pk-1(0). 
3) Do for i = k - 2 down to 1 
a) Map the coefficients of polynomial pi(x) as points: 
(j, aj), for all (i + 1) ≤ j ≤ 2(i + 1). 
b) Interpolate (j, aj), for all (i + 1) ≤ j ≤ 2(i + 1), to generate polynomial pi(x) of degree i. 
c) Evaluate si = pi(0). 
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1.4 DHT: 
A DHT distributes data over a large P2P network, so that we can quickly find any given item and 
distribute responsibility for data storage. The design of a DHT varies like Apache Cassandra, 
BitTorrent DHT, CAN, Chord, Kademlia, Pastry. The basic operations of a DHT are Store(key; 
val), val = Retrieve(key), where a key controls which node(s) stores the value val, and each node 
is responsible for some section of the space. Vanish stores keys in Vuze DHT nodes which 
consists of million nodes, and it is modified Kademlia [15] DHT. Every key and node is assigned 
to an ID of 160 bit, where each key is stored in the node whose ID is closer to its key ID. 
Although Store, Retrieve are the basic operations, the root principle operation that guides these 
functions is the lookup operation. Lookup operation searches for the node that holds a specific 
ID. In Kademlia each node will lookup 20 other closest nodes for the ID it is searching for.  
To store or retrieve a key, the requesting node hashes the key to get its ID of the key. 
This ID is used to map key to the desired node. The requesting node sends a request to 20 other 
nodes that are close to the ID. After finding node closest to the ID, the requesting node contacts 
it directly. If a node wants to join the Vuze DHT, it contacts a peer it knows and requests for a 
lookup for its own ID. After the lookup it finds nodes that are close to its ID. When this new 
node contacts the new peer with the ID among the 20 closest, they replicate all the stored keys to 
that node. 
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The main drawback of the Ephemerizer architecture is that it is centralized. This third party may 
not be trustworthy, as the Ephemerizer may still keep some copies of the keys in its cache 
memory. This calls for a decentralized approach with fewer risks.  
The decentralized Vanish approach has drawbacks 
1. The minimum timeout is fixed. 
 For Vuze architecture, the timeout is 8 hours and for OpenDHT [16] it is about a week. 
Timeout varies with different DHT architectures. So the data or the key shares remain 
active in the node for a minimum of 8 hours. This timeout window is sufficient for 
attackers to steal the keys before they expire. what if a user wants it for one hour? 
2. If a user wants the timeout to be of 20 hours, Vanish extend the life of a VDO by a 
refresh mechanism. The refresh mechanism retrieves original data key K from the DHT 
before its timeout and re-splits it, obtain a fresh new shares and derives a new DHT 
indices I1, I2,..IN and redistributes them in the DHT. The cost of this operation is high, as 
the Vanish has to decapsulate the shares and 
generate a new shares and encapsulate them again. In order to perform this action, 
periodic internet connectivity to a PC is required which is not possible for the users who 
are mobile. 
3. Even after 8 hours (for Vuze) or the timeout the key shares are still available at the node. 
Only the IP of the node changes, but the data in them remains the same. These nodes may 
reappear with a different IP but they hold the same share. 
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4. The Key shares can be recognized by their key length. As per the Vanish design code the 
default key is a 128-bit encryption key and all shares holds the same size, which can be 
easily recognized and cached.  
5. Sybil attacks:  Sybil attacks work by continuously crawling the DHT and saving each 
storage value before timeout. 
Vanish utilizes public DHT Vuze Bit-Torrent. The Vuze DHT clients periodically replicates 
keys they store to other peers that are close to it in order to extend the life of a VDO. Each Vuze 
client manages a routing table that categorizes peers into a number of “K-buckets” by their 
distance from its own ID. 
 The replication properties of the Vuze make the Sybil attack much easier. 
1. To increase availability, Vuze replicates the keys to new clients as soon as they join the 
network.  
2. To ensure resiliency as node joins and leave, Vuze node replicates data they know to their 
neighbors at frequent intervals, usually for every 30 minutes. 
A node joins the Vuze DHT by contacting a known peer and starting a lookup for its own ID. 
It uses a lookup to build its own list of peers and eventually find node that is closest to its ID.  
Using the above replication properties, Sybil node takes very less time to gain majority of 
keys active at that time. It filters necessary to unnecessary keys by measuring its size. A Sybil 
simply hops from one IP to another, through the available identities, thus gaining almost all keys 
stored at different locations. Vuze considers these new fake nodes which act as a new natural 
node and provides them with replicated keys. It takes 3 minutes to hop from one IP to another. 
For an 8 hour period the each Sybil can hop 160 node ID’s with a minimal loss in coverage. 
Sybil attack is optimized by considering default key share size. The Vanish architecture has a 
default share of 128 bit encryption key. Sybil considers only those keys with the default size 
fixed by the Vanish code and leaves rest of the keys or data that does not match default key 
length. 
Even in decentralized approach privacy of data is not guaranteed. It is unsafe for data or keys 
to be handled by only one source (Ephemerizer) or by everyone (DHT). In centralized 
Ephemerizer approach the control or the secret is handled by a third party holder, who is 
considered to be untrustworthy. In the decentralized Vanish approach, it distributes the secret to 
public DHT which is also unreliable as data is placed in public nodes. This decentralized 
approach gives many opening for hackers to steal, cache or record the keys and use them to 
decrypt the encrypted data. 
3. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
In order to overcome the drawbacks, we require a new secure architecture where  data is secure 
and  control over the keys are neither completely under centralized nor  decentralized sources. 
The responsibility over the keys is managed by centralized as well as decentralized sources. 
Sharing responsibilities over the keys will help in building a more secure architecture where data 
can be secure till expiration.  
In these new architecture we use centralized and decentralized approach along with a new 
secret sharing method, which is recusrsive secret sharing. A third party server is introduced in 
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this architecture, which is used to create, advertise and destroy keys and a public DHT is used 
which also distributes keys to public nodes. Types of encryption that occurs in this method are 
data encryption and secret sharing encryption. Data encryption is applied to data and secret 
sharing encryption is applied to secret Nt. The new architecture can be explained in two steps, 
encapsulation and decapsulation. 
3.1 Encapsulation:  
Alice wants to send a data or message to Bob. 
1. Alice sends a request to Ephemerizer server for a key H to encrypt data into cyphertext C 
for a timeout T. (Figure 5) 
2.  Ephemerizer stores timeout T and generates a random nonce Nt, an ID IDt and a secret St 
for that request. Then calculates hash H = (Nt, St) and stores {T, St, IDt}.  
 
Figure 5: Proposed architecture encapsulation 
3. The server sends {Ht, IDt,Nt} to Alice through a secured “SSL” channel and deletes H. 
4. Alice encrypts data with key H giving rise to C the ciphertext and forgets H, now Alice 
has (C, Nt, IDt). It sends Ephemerizer an acknowledgment saying that the file is 
encrypted.  
5. Ephemerizer then picks up an access key L then use it in the cryptographic secure 
pseudorandom number generator to derive n indices into DHT I1,I2,I3….In. 
6. Ephemerizer then performs the recursive secret sharing on (Nt, IDt), where secrets are S = 
Nt, s1 = IDt, S is the main secret and s1 are the additional secret messages. It generates n 
shares H1,H2,H3….Hn where k is the threshold.  
7. Ephemerizer sprinkles n shares H1,H2,H3….Hn at these pseudorandom locations Ii in 
DHT. Then deletes Nt, and sends L and k to Alice.  
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8. The Ephemerizer stores the L values if the requested T is greater than DHT’s fixed 
timeout, else it deletes it. 
9. Finally Alice sends  {L, C, k} 
L: Key to derive the indices related to that C. 
C: Cipher text. 
k: threshold minimum number of shares. 
3.2 Decapsulation: 
 
Figure 6: Proposed architecture decapsulations 
 
1. On receiving {L, C, k}, Bob extracts the access key L. And derives the location of the 
shares. (Figure 6) 
2. Bob retrieves the threshold k number of shares using the indices I1,I2,I3….In, reconstructs 
the secret S and additional secrets S1. Where S= Nt, s1 = IDt. 
3. When Bob wants to decrypt the cypher text C, he sends (Nt, IDt) to the centralized server. 
4. The centralized server checks if the St, IDt are valid or expired by checking the T. If it 
finds expired it sends an error message, else it finds St that is associated with the IDt that 
is still valid, calculates H = h(Nt, St) and sends H to Bob through a secured SSL channel. 
And the server forgets the (T, St, IDt) and H (if the code is designed to read only once). 
5. On receiving H Bob decrypts the cyphertext C and gets the original data.  
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3.3 On Timeout: 
For Vuze the timeout is 8 hour, and as per the churn effect key shares at nodes vanishes 
automatically after the timeout. If the timeout is less than 8 hours, Vanish will still retain key 
shares for eight hours. In the proposed architecture centralized server erases IDt and St from the 
table as shown in figure 7, making cipher text C completely unavailable to access, as key H to 
decrypt the cipher text C cannot be constructed without H and St. 
 
Figure 7: Proposed architecture timeout 
 
3.4 Extending the lifetime of data: 
Some users want their data to be available for more than 8 hours (considering the Vuze DHT). In 
such cases we use same technique as that of Vanish system, that is the refresh mechanism. Here 
just before timeout, Ephemerizer collects all the shares H1,H2,H3…Hk from the DHT and gets 
the secret S = Nt and s1 = IDt. It resplits them getting new shares and redistributes them with a 
new L. 
 
3.5 Overcoming Drawbacks: 
The presented architecture can handle most drawbacks in Vanish and in Ephemerizer 
architecture. This architecture can handle Sybil attacks too.  Using this architecture a minimum 
timeout can be any number of hours specified by the user. If the specified timeout is 2 hours, 
after 2 hours centralized server will delete IDt, St from the table, which makes the key H 
unrecoverable. If the timeout specified is 8 hours, the keys are lost automatically by churn effect 
in DHT, unless life of encrypted data is extended. Even after 8 hours for Vuze, key shares are 
still available at the node, but they cannot be used to recover the key even though they are 
hacked. If the hacker was successfull in retrieving key shares, he still won’t be able to 
reconstruct the original key.  
As mentioned before, the Sybil attack works by continuously crawling DHT and saving 
each key share before timeout and makes a log caching all the key shares. But Sybil attacker 
does not know that the key H is encrypted, which cannot be acquired by just getting Nt and IDt. If 
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Sybil attacker was successful in extracting all the additional secret messages and Nt, it still won’t 
be able to access centralized server to get secret St.   
 
4. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
4.1 Simulation 
The simulation for the proposed method is done using Java 1.6 with extensive Java library 
functions. Here we have considered a 10 MB file as data D. Initially the user who holds data D 
performs data encryption. Here we use AES to encrypt the data using a 128 bit hash key H. The 
hash key H is derived from the Ephemerizer server, which is a simple multithreaded function that 
performs SHA-1 hashing on random numbers (Nt, St) to generate hash key H. This hash key H 
along with additional secret IDt are secret shared using recursive secret sharing algorithm, which 
is programmed in Java. We distributed the shares into the nodes of the Open Chord DHT. The 
simulation is described in four sections.(figure 8) 
 
1. Data encryption 
2. Ephemerizer server 
3. Recursive secret sharing 
4. Distributed hash table 
                       
 Figure 8: Proposed architecture block diagram 
4.1.1 Data Encryption 
The proposed architecture is designed in a way that, it can be used in Cloud, external server 
storage and to transfer data securely. Data is encrypted using the AES encryption technique. 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES):  
AES is a federal standard for private-key or symmetric cryptography, used for the 
encryption of electronic data. It was first introduced by the U.S. government, now used word 
wide. There are many packages of AES encryption. AES was used by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) for storing top secret data. AES was originally called Rijndael, the cipher was 
developed by two Belgian cryptographers, J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. 
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AES is based on substitution permutation network as the design principle. It works 
efficiently and fast in both software and hardware. AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and 
a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. The block size of the AES has a maximum limit of 256 bits, 
but the key size has no maximum limits. AES operates on a 4×4 column-major order matrix of 
bytes, termed the state. Most of the AES calculations are performed in a special finite field.  
AES in Java 
The AES standard has been incorporated into several Java technology offerings. 
Beginning with Java 2 SDK (software development kit), Standard Edition (J2SE) v 1.4.0, JCE 
(Java cryptography extension) [18] was integrated with the SDK and JRE (Java runtime 
environment). JCE provides framework and implementation for encryption, key generation and 
agreement. JCE supplements the Java platform, which already includes interfaces and 
implementations of message digests and digital signatures.  
 
4.1.2 Ephemerizer server 
As discussed earlier, Ephemerizer is simple server external to the user. It performs simple 
operations like creation, deletion and distribution of keys. In this simulation, we have considered 
Ephemerizer server as a multithreaded function that performs all the above operations. The Java 
threading makes it look like a server that runs constantly in a loop. Each thread performs a 
separate task. One thread performs the creation and distribution of keys while the other checks 
the T- timeout periodically. If the thread finds T expired, it simply deletes St. All the variables 
ID, St, T are stored in JTables (Java Tables). 
Hashing SHA-1: 
In this simulation we have used SHA-1 hashing technique in Java. This hashing 
technique is used in calculating the hash key H, H = (Nt, St). SHA-1 is a cryptographic message 
digest algorithm similar to MD5. SHA-1 hash is considered to be one of the most secure hashing 
functions, producing a 160-bit digest from any data with a maximum size of 264 bits. We 
used Java built in classes to compute SHA-1 hash. 
 
4.1.3 Recursive Secret Sharing 
The recursive secret sharing was programed using simple Java programming,  
In this simulation Lagrange’s interpolation was performed using Aitkens method [19]. We have 
recursively secret shared the key Nt (nonce) of size 128 bit and IDt 16 bit to generate various 
numbers of shares. For efficient results, we have considered the threshold ratio of 100%. 
4.1.4 DHT: 
In this simulation we used Open Chord as the DHT. Open Chord is an open source 
implementation of Chord distributed hash table using Java-based implementation of Chord DHT. 
Open Chord provides the possibility to use Chord distributed hash table within Java applications 
by providing an API to store all serializable Java objects within the distributed hash table.  
It provides an interface for Java applications to take part as a peer within a DHT and to 
store and retrieve arbitrary data from this DHT. Open Chord is called open, as it is distributed 
under GNU General Public License (GPL), so that it can be used and extended for own purposes 
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for free as desired. The Open Chord libraries are extracted from Open Chord package zip file 
[20]. 
 
 
Important Features of the Open Chord 
 It can store any serializable JO (Java object) within the DHT. 
 It can create own key implementations used along with DHT by implementing an 
interface of Open Chord API. 
 Facilitates configurable replication of entries in DHT. 
 Provides two  protocols for communicating in between the chord nodes: 
o Local method calls: This protocol is used to create a DHT within one JVM (Java 
Virtual Machine) for testing and visualization purposes. 
o  Java Sockets: This protocol creates a DHT, distributed over different nodes 
(JVMs).  
We used local method call protocol for communicating between 200 chord nodes.  
The basic operations of a DHT are Store(key, val), val = Retrieve(key). A key value 
controls which node(s) stores the value val. Each node is responsible for some section of the 
space. In Open Chord these operations are performed using the following methods 
public void retrieve ( Key key , ChordCallback callback ); 
public void insert ( Key key , Serializable entry , ChordCallback callback ); 
A new network can be created with help of the methods create(), create(URL localURL), 
and create(URL localURL, ID localID). The join methods allow a peer to join an existing Open 
Chord network  
public void join ( URL localURL , URL bootstrapURL ) 
 throws ServiceException ; 
 
4.2 Results: 
We measure the performance of the new architecture by measuring time elapsed to encapsulate 
and decapsulate. Our main purpose is to measure the time and determine whether the new system 
is fast enough for daily usage. In simulation, we have used a Intel Core 2 Duo with 2.00GHz 
processor speed and 4 GB RAM. We measure the time of encapsulation and decapsulation, 
considering a 10 MB files with various shares. In this simulation we have considered a threshold 
ratio of 100%. 
We executed encapsulation and de-capsulation operations and measured the time spent in 
the four main runtime components: DHT operation (storing and retrieving shares), recursive 
secret sharing operation (splitting and combining shares), Ephemerizer server (storing and 
creating hash keys), and encryption/decryption operation. We observed that the DHT component 
accounted for over 99% of execution time for encapsulation and de-capsulation operations on 
data of small and medium size. For data of much larger size, encryption and decryption became a 
dominant component. For recursive secret sharing, we tried various other Lagrange’s 
interpolation methods like the upwards/downward correction method [21] and Apaches 
Lagrange’s interpolation classes [22], and they yielded same results. 
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Executing DHT component using local call protocol, which created the DHT within the 
system’s Java Virtual Machine (JVM), we observed that systems with different configurations 
exhibit different results. Figure 10, 11 shows operation time scale with different number of 
shares for a fixed threshold ration of 100%. Scaling with n (number of shares) is important, as 
data’s security relies on this parameter. Figure 11 shows that time for encapsulation and de-
capsulation grows linearly with the number of shares. De-capsulation took somewhat less time 
than encapsulation, because of DHT. Based on these results, we believe that parameters of n = 50 
and the threshold of 90% provide an excellent tradeoff for security and performance. 
 
 
 
  Figure 9: Encapsulation time performance graph 
 
Figure 10: Decapsulation time performance graph 
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Figure.11: Encapsulation and decapsulation performance graph 
N                   Time (sec) 
Encapsulation Decapsulation 
10 5.78 1.68 
20 10.56 3.56 
50 31.043 24.444 
100 29.719 32.183 
150 48.394 29.74 
200 108.187 91.178 
Figure.12: Encapsulation and decapsulation execution time 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have designed a new architecture to enhance data security by making the data 
disappear after a time limit. This was done by simply encrypting the data with a key and later 
making the key disappear after timeout, ultimately making the data inaccessible. We consider 
key management in centralized as well as decentralized environments. We have successfully 
implemented this architecture. 
This system is more secure and efficient than the earlier system called Vanish. This 
system can be used for storing data on the Cloud or on other servers, or in a database. 
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